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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Importance of Federal Farm Program Law
In recent years, the price and income support offered to pro-
ducers through the federal farm programs has contributed sig-
nificantly to the overall farm economy. Although the
subsidization of farm income is controversial,' its importance
to the farm economy is reflected in the fact that approximately
seventy-five percent or more of the nation's wheat, cotton,
rice, and feed grain acreage has been enrolled in a federal farm
program in each of the last several years.2
1. A recent examination of the controversies surrounding federal farm pro-
grams and federal farm policy can be found in WILLIAM P. BROWNE, et al., SACRED
COWS AND HOT POTATOES: AGRARIAN MYTHS IN AGRICULTURAL POLICY (1992). Not
surprisingly, federal farm programs have produced spirited debate since their incep-
tion. See generally THEODORE SALOUTOS, THE AMERICAN FARMER AND THE NEW DEAL
(1982); GILBERT C. FITE, AMERICAN FARMERS: THE NEW MINORITY (1984).
2. In 1992, at least 90% of the wheat base acres in Montana, North Dakota,
Washington, Kansas, and Oklahoma were enrolled in the wheat program. In North
Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, South Dakota, and Iowa over 80% of the corn base acres
were enrolled in the feed grain program. Except for oats, program participation na-
tionwide was above 75%. Specifically, the percentage of base acres enrolled nation-
wide for each crop in 1992 were as follows: wheat, 82.2%; corn, 75.4%, sorghum,
77.4%; barley, 74.4%; oats, 40.4%; rice, 93%; and upland cotton, 86.5%. Joy Har-
[Vol. 19
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Program enrollment remains high, notwithstanding the cur-
rent fifteen percent reduction in the number of acres eligible
to receive support payments. In past years when farm program
enrollment was high, farm program payments often consti-
tuted a substantial portion of net farm income. For example,
in 1987 when nationwide enrollment peaked above ninety per-
cent for corn, rice, and cotton, and at eighty-eight percent for
wheat, program payments to Indiana farmers accounted for
seventy-four percent of their net farm income.3
B. The Lack of Attorney Involvement
Despite the importance of federal farm program payments
to the agricultural sector in general, and to individual produ-
cers in particular, relatively few attorneys are asked to become
involved in federal farm program matters. Even fewer attor-
neys agree to accept such a task. To some extent, attorneys
have declined to handle federal farm program work because
the monetary sum in dispute did not justify the expenditure in
attorney's fees. More commonly, however, attorneys have de-
clined federal farm program work because of their lack of fa-
miliarity with it.
The reluctance of attorneys to become familiar with the law
of federal farm programs has several consequences. First, it
tends to discourage farmers from seeking the assistance of at-
torneys with farm program matters. Second, it tends to con-
centrate the work in the hands of a few attorneys, some of
whom have developed specialized national federal farm pro-
gram practices.4 The concentration of the practice tends to
limit its availability. In particular, farmers with relatively small
program payments at issue do not have access to legal advice
regarding federal farm programs.5
wood, How 1992 Program Enrollment Is Shaping Up, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, July 1992, at 4.
See generally United States Gen. Accounting Office, FARMING AND FARM PROGRAMS:
IMPACT ON THE RURAL ECONOMY AND ON FARMERS (RCED-90-108BR, Apr. 1990).
3. Down on the Farm, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1990, at Al.
4. See Fighting for Your Rights with ASCS-A Special Report, PRO FARMER, Feb. 2,
1991, at 3 (listing ten attorneys who handle federal farm program matters).
5. In 1987, the average payment nationally was $13,800. Cotton producers re-
ceived an average of $29,380, and cash grain producers averaged $16,986. ROBERT
D. REINSEL, THE DISTRIBUTION OF FARM PROGRAM PAYMENTS, 1987 2-10 (U.S. Dept.
of Agric., Info. Bull. No. 607, 1990). Nevertheless, farm program disputes occasion-
ally involve a million dollars or more. See Thomas M. Burton, Cash Crop: Many Farm-
ers Harvest Government Subsidies in Violation of Law, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1990, at AI
1993]
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More significant, however, a lack of familiarity with federal
farm program law can also affect an attorney's ability to serve
farm clients in other areas. For example, estate planning,6
bankruptcy,7 real estate transactions, including leases,' and ba-
sic business organizational planning may result in actions be-
ing taken that affect the farm client's eligibility to receive all or
a part of federal farm program payments. Examples of such
instances are most commonly seen in the failure to coordinate
estate, real estate, and business organizational planning with
the federal farm program payment limitation rules. 9
Although these consequences have negative effects, they
also suggest the presence of opportunities. First, recognizing
farmers' general reluctance to use attorneys, an attorney with a
basic familiarity of the law of federal farm programs could re-
sult in existing farm clients and potential farm clients having a
greater "comfort level" with them. Second, the agricultural
sector is an underserved legal market.' 0 Most attorneys who
(describing a pending dispute involving approximately $2.8 million in program
payments).
6. The federal farm program payment limitation rules specifically address the
eligibility of trusts and estates for program benefits. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1497.102,
1497.103 (1992). Also, husbands and wives seeking to participate in the federal farm
programs as separate .persons" must avoid estate planning arrangements that would
disqualify either one of them under the payment limitation rules applicable to
spouses. See 7 C.F.R. § 1497.104 (1992). See generally Christopher R. Kelley, Separate
"Person" Determinations for Spouses under the 1990 Farm Bill, AGRIC. L. UPDATE, Mar.
1991, at 4.
7. See Christopher R. Kelley & Susan A. Schneider, Selected Issues of Federal Farm
Program Payments in Bankruptcy, 14J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 99 (1992) [hereinafter Kelley
& Schneider, Selected Issues].
8. For example, the sale of all or part of a farm with a program base may pres-
ent the need to "reconstitute" the farm for federal farm program purposes. See 7
C.F.R. § 719.1-719.14 (1992). In addition, lease arrangements may implicate the
landlord's or the tenant's farm program eligibility under the payment limitations
"cash rent tenants" rules, 7 C.F.R. § 1497.401 (1992), or under one of the several
rules prohibiting unfair treatment of tenants. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. §§ 1410.7, 1413.111
(1992).
9. See generally Christopher R. Kelley & Alan R. Malasky, Federal Farm Program
Payment-Limitations Law: A Lawyer's Guide, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 199 (1991) [here-
inafter Kelley & Malasky, Payment Limitations]; J.W. Looney & Lonnie R. Beard, Farm
Business Planning. Coordinating Farm Program Payment Rules with Tax Law, 57 UMKC L.
REV. 157 (1989) [hereinafter Looney & Beard, Farm Business Planning]. See also Alan
R. Malasky, ASCS Appeals and Payment Limitation Revisions in the 1990 Farm Bill: What
Did the American Farmer Really Gain (Or Lose)?, 68 N.D. L. REV. 365 (1992) [hereinafter
Malasky, Revisions in the 1990 Farm Bill].
10. See generally Neil D. Hamilton, The Study of Agricultural Law in the United States:
Education, Organization and Practice, 43 ARK. L. REV. 503 (1990).
[Vol. 19
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serve it tend to confine their practice to areas that overlap the
agricultural sector and the non-agricultural sector. Few attor-
neys have strategically positioned themselves to serve the un-
crowded niche presented by the legal problems shared by the
agricultural sector alone." Finally, familiarity with farm pro-
gram requirements may enhance an attorney's ability to per-
form other basic services for farm clients such as estate
planning, real estate transactions, and business organizational
planning. For bankruptcy attorneys, it also may enhance the
attorney's ability to assist the client in securing funding for the
financing of plans or other debt resolution arrangements.'
2
For those unfamiliar with the arcane world of federal farm
program law, the task of becoming familiar with the program
rules can appear to be daunting. Program requirements
change frequently because of legislative and regulatory actions
and because of shifts in the USDA's interpretations of the pro-
grams' rules. I3 Even those who frequently handle farm pro-
gram matters find that it is sometimes difficult to fathom
program rules or to identify or obtain the needed resources to
assist them in that endeavor.
This Article is divided into two major parts. Section II, im-
mediately following this introduction, offers a basic starting
point for those seeking to become familiar with federal farm
program law. 14 It offers a brief synopsis of the workings of sev-
eral of the most important commodity programs, noting the
significant primary sources for the law governing those pro-
grams and potentially helpful secondary materials. That sy-
nopsis is followed by several suggestions for avoiding federal
farm program disputes.
Section III of the Article briefly reviews the Agricultural Sta-
bilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) administrative ap-
peal process. The review is followed by a discussion of
11. See S.S. Samuelson & L. Fahey, Strategic Planning for Law Firms: The Application
of Management Theory, 52 U. Prr. L. REv. 435 (1991) (relating the importance of posi-
tioning a law practice to serve underserved or "niche" markets).
12. See generally Kelley & Schneider, Selected Issues, supra note 7.
13. Occasionally, the USDA seeks to rely on program rules without being able to
establish the existence of the rule. Golightly v. Yeutter, 780 F. Supp. 672, 677-78 (D.
Ariz. 1991) (rejecting the USDA's reliance on a "bright line rule" in the absence of
any written interpretation establishing such a rule).
14. Because federal farm program law is largely a subspecies of federal adminis-
trative law, familiarity with federal administrative law is foundational. See BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (3d ed. 1991).
1993]
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proposed legislation that would change the current administra-
tive review process and a summary of some of the most signifi-
cant recent judicial decisions involving federal farm programs.
This section concludes with a discussion of common problems
ocurring in farm program litigation.
II. FEDERAL FARM PROGRAMS AND AVOIDING FEDERAL FARM
PROGRAM DISPUTES
A. A Synopsis of the Major Federal Farm Programs
Federal farm programs are established or reauthorized by
Congress, usually through legislation enacted every four to five
years. The most recent five-year "farm bill" is the Food, Agri-
culture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 (FACTA). l5
The provisions of the 1990 farm bill govern the programs for
the 1991-95 crop years. Additionally, several important farm
program provisions for the 1991-95 crop years, including the
reduction in acreage eligible for support,' 6 are found in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990."7
Congress has made the Secretary of Agriculture responsible
for implementing the farm programs. In turn, the Secretary
uses the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) as the fiscal
agency for funding the programs and the personnel of the
15. PUB. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3359 (1990). Some farm programs are en-
acted separately from the five-year farm program legislation, notably special disaster
program legislation. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1471j (West Supp. 1992) (Emergency
Livestock Feed Assistance Act of 1988).
16. See generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FARM PROGRAM FLEXIBILITY: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE TRIPLE BASE OPTION (Dec. 1989) (explaining the policy considera-
tions underlying the reduction in acreage eligible for support).
17. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). See generally USDA, ECON. RES.
SERV., THE BASIC MECHANISMS OF U.S. FARM POLICY: How THEY WORK, WITH EXAM-
PLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS (Misc. Pub. No. 1479, Jan. 1990); USDA, ECON. RES. SERV.,
THE 1990 FARM ACT AND THE 1990 BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT (Misc. Pub. No.
1489, Dec. 1990) (explaining the fundamental elements of the basic farm programs
from 1985 to the present). These publications can be purchased for $8.00 and $6.50,
respectively, by calling 1-800-999-6779.
See also J. W. LOONEY, ET AL., AGRICULTURAL LAW: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO REPRE-
SENTING FARM CLIENTS (1990) (available for $49.95 from the American Bar Associa-
tion, Order Fulfillment 515, 750 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, IL 60611); DR.
NEIL E. HARL, 11 AGRICULTURAL LAW ch. 91 (1991 & Supp. 1992); Howard B. Pick-
ard, Price and Income Adjustment Programs, AGRICULTURAL LAW 1 Uohn H. Davidson ed.,
1981 & Supp. 1989) (discussing the basics of federal farm programs). Current pro-
gram information is also available in the form of "Fact Sheets" and similar docu-
ments from county and state ASCS offices.
[Vol. 19
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ASCS to administer them.' 8
Producer participation in the federal farm commodity pro-
grams is voluntary and it is incumbent upon each producer
seeking to participate to know the program requirements.
Most of the program statutes and program regulations are
found in Title 7 of the United States Code and in Title 7 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, respectively. There are, how-
ever, several statutes found outside Title 7.19 The ASCS's
county and state offices receive guidance on the implementa-
tion of the applicable statutes and regulations through an in-
ternal agency operating manual, the ASCS Handbook for State
and County Offices (ASCS Handbook), issued by the ASCS
Deputy Administrator for State and County Operations
(DASCO). 20
18. See Stegall v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 765, 768-69 n.2 (1990) ("In practice,
the CCC handles funding of the subsidy programs, while state and county ASCS
committees are responsible for day-to-day administration."). See also infra note 60
(listing articles discussing the functions of the ASCS and the ASCS dispute resolution
process).
19. Provisions found outside Title 7 are as follows: the county and state commit-
tee system, 16 U.S.C. § 590h (1988 & Supp. III 1991); the erodible land and wetland
conservation and reserve programs, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3862 (1988 & Supp. 1991),
including the conservation reserve program (CRP), 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831-3836 (1988 &
Supp. III 1991), the wetland reserve program (WRP), 16 U.S.C. §§ 3837-3837f
(Supp. III 1991), the highly erodible land ("sodbuster"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-3813
(1988 & Supp. III 1991) and wetlands protection requirements ("swampbuster"), 16
U.S.C. §§ 3821-3824 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); and the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion Charter Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 14-714p (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
20. The ASCS Handbook consists of approximately 170 separately titled, loose-leaf
notebook volumes. Each volume is supplemented and modified through amend-
ments and administrative notices with varying frequency. Some of the volumes
change very often and, in some instances, multiple amendments to a volume may be
issued nearly simultaneously. Because county and state ASCS personnel and com-
mittees are instructed to act in accordance with the directives contained in the vari-
ous Handbook volumes, the Handbook should always be consulted.
Any volume of the Handbook may be inspected at any county or state ASCS office,
and program participants may obtain a free copy of the volumes relating to the pro-
gram in which he or she participates by writing or calling the Information Division,
ASCS/USDA, P.O. Box 2415, Washington, D.C. 20013 (202-720-5875). Requests
for Handbook volumes should specify the volume(s) desired. Frequent, periodic re-
quests must be made in order to maintain a current version of any of the Handbook
volumes.
Additional explanations of the ASCS Handbook can be found in Christopher R.
Kelley & John S. Harbison, A Guide to the ASCS Administrative Appeal Process and to the
Judicial Review of ASCS Decisions (pts. 1 & 2), 36 S.D. L. REV. 14, 30-32 (1991), 36 S.D.
L. REV. 435 (1991) [hereinafter Kelley & Harbison, A Guide], and Kelley & Malasky,
Payment Limitations, supra note 9, at 210-15. Because the Soil Conservation Service
(SCS) makes certain determinations under the conservation programs, maintaining a
current copy of the SCS's internal operating manual covering those programs is also
19931
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1. Program Eligibility and Program Payment Limitations
Each program requires participants to meet certain initial
and continuing eligibility criteria specific to the particular pro-
gram. In addition, eligibility for most of the major domestic
commodity programs is conditioned on the producer meeting
the "person" and "actively engaged in farming" requirements
of the program payment limitation rules. 21 The program pay-
ment limitation rules also establish limits on the amount of
program payments that a "person" may receive. Accordingly,
the payment limitation rules are a particularly important aspect
of federal farm program law.22
2. The Major Commodity Programs
For purposes of this Article, the major federal farm pro-
grams for agricultural commodities are divided according to
their primary function: price support, income support, and
advisable. See generally Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Issues in Enforcing Federal Soil Conserva-
tion Programs: An Introduction and Preliminary Review, 23 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 637 (1990).
21. See 7 C.F.R. § 1497.1(a)(1992) (listing programs subject to the "person" and
"actively engaged in farming" requirements); see also 7 C.F.R. § 1497.1 (b)(1992) (list-
ing programs subject only to the "person" requirement).
22. The statutory provisions for the current payment limitations are found at 7
U.S.C. §§ 1308-1-1308-5 (West 1988 & West Supp. 1992). The regulations are
found at 7 C.F.R. § 1497 (1992), and the current ASCS Handbook volume on payment
limitations is entitled "Payment Limitations" and is known by the short-reference of
I-PL (Rev. 1).
Explanations of the payment limitation rules can be found in Kelley & Malasky,
Payment Limitations, supra note 9, and Looney & Beard, Farm Business Planning, supra
note 9. Readers of both articles should be aware, however, that the ASCS renum-
bered the payment limitations regulations on April 18, 1991, after the preparation or
publication of each article. 7 C.F.R. § 1497 (1992). In addition, the ASCS Handbook
volume on payment limitations was revised subsequent to publication of the articles.
See ASCS Handbook, Payment Limitations, 1 -PL (Rev. 1).
Because the payment limitation rules are extensive and complex, the potential
for running afoul of one or more of the rules is significant, particularly if more than
one individual or entity participates in the farming operation. Special attention
should always be paid to the proscriptions regarding the source and type of contribu-
tions to the farming operation when more than one individual or entity participates
in the farming operation. Those proscriptions are found in the definitions of "capi-
tal," land, and equipment in 7 C.F.R. § 1497.3 (1992).
Program participants should also be aware of the new "end-of-year" review pro-
cedures put into effect beginning with reviews of 1991 crop year compliance. In es-
sence, those reviews are thorough examinations of whether the participants selected
for review complied with their farm operating plan (Form CCC-502) for the crop
year. The instructions and checklists for conducting the reviews are found at ASCS
Handbook, Payment Limitations, I-PL (Rev. 1), § 3, 671-704 (Amend. 5).
[Vol. 19
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conservation.
a. Price Support: Nonrecourse Loans
Price support is primarily accomplished through nonre-
course loans24 for which participating producers pledge their
crops as collateral.2 5 Crops eligible for nonrecourse loans in-
clude rice,2 6 feed grains,27 peanuts,28 oilseeds, 9 upland cot-
ton,30 and wheat. I The loan period is normally nine months.32
While the commodity is under loan, the producer is responsi-
ble for maintaining the crop's grade, quantity, and quality if
the commodity is stored on the farm.33 The producer has the
23. Federal farm programs also have a "production adjustment" component
which is implemented through acreage allotments, marketing quotas, cropland set-
asides, acreage reductions, paid acreage diversions, farmer-owned reserves, and con-
servation reserves. See Geoffrey S. Becker, FUNDAMENTALS OF DOMESTIC COMMODITY
PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS 15-23 (Cong. Res. Serv. No. 86-128 ENR, 1986).
24. The statutory provisions for nonrecourse loans are found beginning at 7
U.S.C. § 1421 (West 1988 & West Supp. 1992), with additional provisions found in
the respective sections of Title 7 applicable to each supported crop. The regulations
pertaining to price support for wheat, feed grains, rice, oilseeds, and farm-stored
peanuts are found at 7 C.F.R. § 1421 (1992) and for cotton at 7 C.F.R. § 1427
(1992).
Most of the internal agency directives for administering the nonrecourse and
other price support loan programs can be found in the following current revisions of
ASCS Handbook volumes: Loans and Purchases, I-LP; Loan and Purchase Programs
for Barley, Corn, Oats, Rye, Sorghum, Soybeans, and Wheat, 2-LP Grain; Honey
Loans and Purchases, 2-LP Honey; Peanut Loans and Purchases, 2-LP Peanuts; Rice
Loans and Purchases, 2-LP Rice; Cotton Loans and Loan Deficiency Payments, 7-CN;
and Acreage Compliance Determinations, 2-CP (containing instructions regarding
fees for measurement services). Because the titles, short-reference designations, re-
vision numbers, and contents of the Handbook volumes are subject to change, it is
advisable to ascertain from the ASCS whether the volume and its contents are cur-
rent when consulting a particular Handbook volume.
25. Price support is also accomplished through government purchases. See, e.g.,
7 C.F.R. § 1421.21 (1992).
26. 7 U.S.C. § 1441-2(a) (Supp. III 1991).
27. 7 U.S.C. § 1444f(a) (Supp. III 1991).
28. 7 U.S.C. § 1445c-3 (Supp. III 1991).
29. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1446(a), 1446f (Supp. III 1991).
30. 7 U.S.C. § 1444-2(a) (Supp. III 1991).
31. 7 U.S.C. § 1445b-3a(a) (Supp. III 1991).
32. Under the farmer owned reserve program, producers of wheat and feed
grains may receive extended loans and storage payments after the expiration of the
nine-month price support loan. 7 U.S.C. § 1445e (1988 & Supp. III 1991); 7 C.F.R.
§§ 1421.200-1421.216 (1992). See 7 C.F.R. § 1474 (1992) (farm storage facility loan
program regulations); see also Doug Martinez, Farmer-Owned Reserve: Old Name, New
Program, FARMLINE, June 1991, at 4.
33. 7 C.F.R. § 1421.15 (1992).
1993]
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option of repaying the loan at the loan rate, a per bushel,
pound, or hundredweight sum, or forfeiting the collateral.
Receipt of the forfeited crop is the government's only re-
course if the loan is not repaid. Because program participants
can always receive the loan price no matter how low the market
price falls, the nonrecourse loan program effectively estab-
lishes the minimum price for the commodity. Because the loan
rate (or the market price) may be less than the sum that Con-
gress has deemed to be a desirable return (target price), defi-
ciency payments, which are discussed below, make up the
difference. 4
b. Income Support: Deficiency Payments
Deficiency payments are the primary means of providing in-
come support to producers of certain commodities.3 5 They
serve as an income "safety net" when market prices are low.
36
Deficiency payments are direct payments to participating
producers of feed grains,3 7 wheat,3 8 rice, 39 and upland cot-
34. See generally Claude T. Coffman, Target Prices, Deficiency Payments, and the Agricul-
ture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, 50 N.D. L. REV. 299, 305 (1974) (discussing
the basic function of the nonrecourse loan program and the development of the "tar-
get price" concept).
35. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1441-2(c), 1444-2(c), 1444f(c), 1445b-3a(c) (Supp. III 1991)(the
authority for deficiency payments for rice, upland cotton, feed grains, and wheat,
respectively). See also, 7 C.F.R. pt. 1413 (1992) (deficiency payment program regula-
tions).
The ASCS Handbook volumes applicable to the deficiency payment programs are
the current versions of the following Handbooks: Feed Grain, Rice, Cotton, and Wheat
Programs, 5-PA; Feed Grain, Rice, Cotton, and Wheat Program Payments, 7-PA;
Acreage Compliance Determinations, 2-CP; Common Management and Operating
Provisions, 1-CM; Common Farm and Program Provisions, 2-CM; Agricultural Con-
servation Program Development and General Provisions, I-ACP; Agricultural Con-
servation Program Daily Operation and Automation Instructions, 2-ACP (Rev. 2);
and Farm Reconstitutions, 2-CM. Because the titles, short-reference designations,
revision numbers, and contents of the Handbook volumes are subject to change, it is
advisable to ascertain from the ASCS whether the volume and its contents are cur-
rent when consulting a particular Handbook volume.
36. See H.R. REP. No. 100-391(I), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-46 (accompanying the Farm Program Payments Integrity
Act of 1987, enacted as a part of the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of
1987, PuB. L. No. 100-203, §§ 1301-07, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330(2)-1330(19) which de-
scribes deficiency payments as an "income 'safety net' for persons who depend on a
profitable pursuit of agricultural product for their livelihood").
37. 7 U.S.C. § 1444f(c) (Supp. III 1991). Feed grains include corn, grain sor-
ghums, oats, and barley.
38. 7 U.S.C. § 1445b-3a(c) (Supp. III 1991).
39. 7 U.S.C. § 1441-2(c) (Supp. III 1991).
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ton.40 The payment rate is a per-commodity unit rate based on
the difference between the target price and the averaged mar-
ket price or the loan rate, whichever difference is less.4'
To participate in the deficiency program, a producer may
have to set-aside land, idling it from production. Under this
set aside requirement, known as the acreage reduction pro-
gram (ARP),4 2 the idled land must be put into conservation
uses (CU), also known as the acreage conservation reserve
(ACR).4
Deficiency payments are not paid on the basis of actual pro-
duction. Instead, they are based on the producer's "base
acres" 44 minus the producer's ACR acres. The resulting "per-
mitted acres" are then multiplied by the program yield 45 to de-
termine program production. Program production is the
quantity eligible for deficiency payments when the producer
plants the maximum permitted acres.4 6
Under the current payment acres47 and associated planting
flexibility48 provisions of the deficiency program, the maxi-
mum acreage allowable for payment is now eighty-five percent
of the crop acreage base established for the crop, minus acre-
age idled under the ARP. The net effect of the "nonpayment
acres" is a fifteen percent reduction in potential deficiency
payments .49
c. Conservation
In addition to the ACR program, the Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP), the Wetland Reserve Program (WRP), the
highly erodible land ("sodbuster"), wetland protection
("swampbuster"), and conservation compliance requirements
40. 7 U.S.C. § 1444-2(c) (Supp. III 1991).
41. See id.
42. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1413.51, 1413.54 (1992).
43. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1413.60-1413.72 (1992).
44. See 7 U.S.C. § 1463 (Supp. 1II 1991).
45. See 7 U.S.C. § 1465 (1988 & Supp. III 1991), 7 U.S.C. § 1466 (1988 & Supp.
III 1991). Program yields have been frozen since 1985. Id.
46. See 7 C.F.R. § 1413.108(d) (1992) (setting forth the formula for calculating
deficiency payments).
47. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1441-2(c)(1)(C) (rice), 1444-2(c)(1)(C) (upland cotton),
1444f(c)(1)(C) (feed grains), 1445b-3a(c)(1)(C) (wheat) (Supp. III 1992).
48. 7 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
49. See generally Harry S. Baumes, Pressure for Policy Reform: The U.S. & EC Move in
Market Oriented Direction, in AGRIC. OUTLOOK, July 1992, 24, at 26.
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also serve to promote the conservation goals of the federal
farm programs. The CRP pays producers to take highly erod-
ible and other qualifying land out of production, generally for
ten years.5 ° The CRP, together with the WRP, is now referred
to as "Environmental Conservation Acreage Reserve Pro-
gram" (ECARP). 5'
The WRP was created by the 1990 farm bill to enable the
ASCS to purchase conservation easements on eligible wet-
lands. 52 Under final rules published on June 4, 1992, the pro-
gram began as a pilot program in nine states. 3
The sodbuster, swampbuster, and conservation compliance
provisions applicable to federal farm program participants
serve to penalize producers who plant crops on certain highly
erodible land or wetlands, or producers who farm without an
approved conservation plan.54 In implementing the conserva-
tion provisions, the ASCS shares responsibility with the Soil
Conservation Service (SCS),5 5 which has published its internal
guidelines in its National Food Security Act Manual. 6
d. Miscellaneous Matters
Other matters relevant to federal farm programs include the
50. The governing statute is found at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831-3836 (1988 & Supp. III
1991). The current regulations are found at 7 C.F.R. pt. 1410 (1992). The current
ASCS Handbook volume for the CRP is Conservation Reserve Program, 2-CRP. See
generally Roger A. McEowen & Neil E. Harl, A Look at the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP) and How It Affects Owners and Tenants of Marginal Land, 12 J. AGRuc. TAX'N & L.
121 (1990).
51. See 7 C.F.R. § 1410.1 (1992).
52. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3837-3837(f) (Supp. III 1991).
53. 57 Fed. Reg. 23,908 (1992) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 703) (proposed
June 4, 1992). The current ASCS Handbook volumes for the WRP are Wetlands Re-
serve Program, I-WRP, and Wetlands Reserve Program Automation Operations, 2-
WRP. The nine states include: California, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, New York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin. Id.
54. See 16 U.S.C. § 3811 (1988 & Supp. I 1991). The current regulations are
found at 7 C.F.R. § 12 (1992). The applicable ASCS Handbook volume is Highly Erod-
ible Land and Wetland Conservation, 6-CP. See generally Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Issues
in Enforcing Federal Soil Conservation Programs: An Introduction and Preliminary Review, 23
U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 637 (1990).
55. 16 U.S.C. § 590c (1988). The SCS administrative appeal regulations are
found at 7 C.F.R. pt. 614 (1992).
56. A free copy of the National Food Security Act Manual can be obtained by writing
to Claudette Hayes, Soil Conservation Service, USDA, P.O. Box 2890, Washington
D.C. 20013.
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following: determination of acreage and compliance;57 recon-
stitution of farms, allotments, normal crop acreage and pre-
ceding year planted acreage; 8 computation of the expiration
of time limitations;59 administrative appeals;6' administrative
equitable relief for reasonable reliance upon ASCS "misaction
or misinformation; ' 61 administrative equitable relief based on
substantial compliance; 62 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
66
requests; 3 debt settlement policies and procedures, including
administrative offset;6 and assignment of payments.6 5
B. Avoiding Federal Farm Program Disputes
The federal farm programs' complexity and changing re-
quirements not only make it difficult for most producers to
keep abreast of current program requirements, they also chal-
lenge the abilities of ASCS officials and committee members to
be fully informed and to understand all of the various require-
57. 7 C.F.R. pt. 718 (1992); ASCS Handbook, Acreage Compliance Determina-
tions, 2-CP & Aerial Photography, I-AP.
58. 7 C.F.R. pt. 719 (1992); ASCS Handbook, Farm Reconstitutions, 2-CM & Com-
mon Farm and Program Provisions, 2-CM.
59. 7 C.F.R. pt. 720 (1992).
60. 7 U.S.C. § 1433e (Supp. III 1991); 7 C.F.R. pt. 780 (1992); ASCS Handbook,
Appeals, I-APP. For explanations of the ASCS dispute resolution process, including
judicial review of final ASCS determinations, see Alice Devine, Understanding the Cur-
rent Crisis with the ASCS, 9J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 195 (1987); Neil D. Hamilton, Farmers'
Rights to Appeal ASCS Decisions Denying Farm Program Benefits, 29 S.D. L. REV. 282
(1984); Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Issues Arising in Federal Court Appeals of ASCS Decisions
Administering Federal Farm Programs, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 633 (1989); Kelley &
Harbison, A Guide, supra note 20; Malasky, Revisions in the 1990 Farm Bill, supra note 9;
Ralph A. Linden, An Overview of the Commodity Credit Corporation and the Procedures and
Risks of Litigating Against It, 11J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 305 (1990); AlexanderJ. Pires,Jr.
& Shelley L. Bagoly, Federal Court Jurisdiction over USDA/ASCS Cases: How and In What
Courts Farmers Can Seek Review of USDA Denials of Their Farm Subsidy Payments, 24 IND. L.
REV. 1489 (1991).
61. 7 U.S.C. § 1339a (1988 & Supp. III 1991); 7 C.F.R. pt. 790 (1992); ASCS
Handbook, Failure To Fully Comply, 4-CP. See generally Christopher R. Kelley, ASCS
Appeals: The Equitable Authority of DASCO, AGRIC. L. UPDATE, June 1990, 4.
62. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1441-2(g) (rice), 1444-2(g) (upland cotton), 1444f(h) (feed
grains), 1445b-3a(h) (wheat) (Supp. III 1991); 7 C.F.R. pt. 791 (1992); ASCS Hand-
book, Failure To Fully Comply, 4-CP.
63. 7 C.F.R. pt. 798 (1992); ASCS Handbook, Information Available to the Public,
12-DS & Privacy Act Operations, 13-DS.
64. 7 C.F.R. pt. 1403 (1992); ASCS Handbook, CCC Program Claims, 55-FI, Man-
aging CCC and ASCS Claims, 58-Fl SCOAP, & Management of ASCS Claims, 59-FI.
See also Kelley & Schneider, Selected Issues, supra note 7.
65. 7 C.F.R. pt. 1404 (1992); ASCS Handbook, Common Farm and Program Provi-
sions, 2-CM.
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ments. Additionally, despite the best of intentions, ASCS em-
ployees share the human shortcomings of losing or misplacing
files and other paperwork, failing to follow instructions, and
making other errors or omissions that can have serious conse-
quences for a program participant. A few ASCS employees oc-
casionally let bias, jealousy, and other improper motives
interfere with the performance of their work. Therefore, pro-
gram participants should deal with the ASCS in the manner
most likely to protect their interests.
Producers desiring to participate in federal farm programs
bear the burden of establishing their initial and continuing eli-
gibility for program payments. Even if a mistake is clearly the
ASCS's, the burden of correcting it will be borne by the
producer.
Attorneys who represent program participants should con-
sider advising their farm clients to adopt the following prac-
tices to ensure that producers may more easily carry the
burden of establishing their eligibilty for program benefits:
1. Make and keep a copy of each and every form or other
document submitted or signed in connection with
participation in a federal farm program.
Farming is difficult enough without the loss of program ben-
efits because the county ASCS office lost or misplaced
paperwork showing that a producer has timely and properly
applied for the program. Nevertheless, benefits have been de-
nied because of lost or misplaced paperwork. Ultimately, the
producer will lose unless the producer can prove, with dupli-
cate copies and persuasive testimony, that the appropriate
forms were submitted timely.
Accordingly, program applicants and participants should al-
ways make and keep a copy of each and every form or other
document submitted or signed in connection with participa-
tion in a program. Ideally, the copies should show that the
original was received on a certain date by the county office.
This can be done by requesting that the county office note on
the copies the date on which the originals were received or
processed and the name or initials of the person processing
the documents. Likewise the use of return-receipt mail would
ensure the same protection.
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2. Keep all records necessary to prove compliance with program
requirements, including compliance with each year's
farm operating plan (Form CCC-502), for at
least six years.
The statute of limitations for civil claims against program
participants brought by the CCC is six years.6 6 Thus, the gov-
ernment generally has a six-year period within which to seek to
recover improperly made payments.67
Maintaining all records necessary to prove compliance with
program requirements for at least six years is a good practice.
The records should include all documentation needed to show
full compliance with each annual farm operating plan, includ-
ing records supporting the statements made on CCC Form
502 or one of that form's variants. Documents relating to such
matters as the required annual crop reports and compliance
with the conservation requirements should also be maintained.
3. Program participants should carefully read all forms and
contracts associated with the programs in which they
participate.
Federal farm program contracts are legally binding agree-
ments. Program participants face full or partial loss of pro-
gram benefits and, in some cases, the imposition of financial
penalties, if the program requirements are not satisfied. In
most situations, county and state ASCS personnel and county
and state committees do not have the authority to waive pro-
66. 15 U.S.C. § 714b(c) (1988).
67. However, the 1990 farm bill makes certain ASCS determinations final after
90 days:
Decisions of the State and county committees . . . or employees of such
committees made in good faith in the absence of misrepresentation, false
statement, fraud, or wilful misconduct, unless otherwise appealed under this
section, shall be final, unless otherwise modified under subsection (f) of this
section within 90 days, and no action shall be taken to recover amounts
found to have been disbursed thereon in error unless the producer had rea-
son to believe that the decision was erroneous.
7 U.S.C. § 1433e(g) (Supp. III 1991).
See also 7 C.F.R. § 780.17(c), (d) (1992). This "90-day finality provision" may
give program participants substantially greater protection against requests for repay-
ment of allegedly improperly paid program benefits than existed prior to the 1990
farm bill's enactment. Nevertheless, the ASCS will likely be quick to assert that the
producer obtained the improperly paid payments based on false statements, and, in
any case, because the provision is new, the extent of the protection provided by it has
yet to be judicially determined.
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gram requirements. 68 Hence, a producer who acts inconsis-
tently with the terms of the program contract or the underlying
regulations does so at his or her peril, even if the action was
taken with the permission of a county or state ASCS official.69
In some program contracts, the most significant program re-
quirements are explicitly stated in the contract. Frequently,
however, the requirements are incorporated by reference to
the applicable regulations. Therefore, to be fully informed of
the program requirements, the producer must read the con-
tract, the regulations, and the interpretations of those regula-
tions contained in the ASCS Handbook. To the extent possible
or practical, those materials should be consulted before the
producer enrolls in the program or undertakes actions while
enrolled in the program that may affect his program eligibility.
III. ASCS ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS AND RECENT FEDERAL
FARM PROGRAM LITIGATION
As previously discussed, the federal farm price and income
support programs are an important component of federal farm
policy, and their contribution to the agricultural economy is
substantial. Although the long-term prospects for continued
federal involvement in price and income support are uncer-
tain, attorneys should not overlook the immediate importance
of federal farm program law to their farm clients. Understand-
ing the federal farm program dispute resolution process is an
important aspect of providing legal services to federal farm
program participants.
A. The ASCS Administrative Appeal Process
ASCS administration of the federal farm programs is decen-
tralized. Most decisions are made at the local level by the ASC
committee in the county where the affected farm is located.70
The activities of the county committees in each state are super-
vised by a state ASC committee." At the national level, the
ASCS Deputy Administrator for State and County Operations
68. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. §§ 1413.2(b), 1421.2(b), 1497.2(b) (1992).
69. In such circumstances, administrative equitable relief may be available. See 7
C.F.R. pt. 790 (1992).
70. See 7 C.F.R. § 7.21 (1992).
71. See 7 C.F.R. § 7.20 (1992).
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(DASCO) oversees the county and state committees. 7
Prior to the enactment of the producer appeal provisions of
the 1990 farm bill,73 an appeal of an adverse decision by the
county committee went from the county committee to the state
committee and then to DASCO, with DASCO making the final
decision. 74 The 1990 farm bill changed the appeal process by
substituting the Director of the ASCS National Appeals Divi-
sion (NAD) for DASCO as the final administrative appeal au-
thority in the appeal process. 75 Regulations implementing the
revised appeals process were issued as interim final rules on
November 25, 1991.76 Proposed changes to those rules were
published on September 23, 1992. 7
1. Review by the County Committee
Participating producers generally receive most of their initial
program decisions from the local county committee. However,
on occasion, DASCO either makes initial determinations or in-
structs the county or state to make a certain initial determina-
tion. If the producer receives an appealable adverse decision
from the county committee, the producer can, within fifteen
days of the mailing of the adverse determination, request that
the county committee reconsider its decision. 78 The request
for reconsideration must be in writing, and it must be signed
by the producer or an authorized representative. 79 The re-
quest must be accompanied by, or later supplemented with, a
supporting written statement setting forth the facts."0 The
producer can request an informal hearing to present relevant
evidence to the county committee or request that the decision
be made on the basis of a written statement. 8' The producer is
also entitled to request that a stenographic reporter transcribe
the hearing at the producer's expense. 82 The committee will
72. See Kelley & Harbison, A Guide, supra note 20, at 27.
73. 7 U.S.C. § 1433e (Supp. III 1991).
74. 7 C.F.R. § 780.9 (1992).
75. 7 U.S.C. § 1433e (Supp. III 1991).
76. 56 Fed. Reg. 59,207 (1991) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 780)(proposed Nov. 25,
1991).
77. 57 Fed. Reg. 43,937 (proposed Sept. 23, 1992).
78. 7 C.F.R. § 780.15(a) (1992).
79. 7 C.F.R. § 780.16 (1992).
80. Id.
81. 7 C.F.R. §§ 780.7(a), 780.16 (1992).
82. 7 C.F.R. § 780.9(e) (1992).
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then review its initial determination and issue its decision.83
2. Review by the State Committee
If, after reconsideration, the county committee affirms its ad-
verse decision, the producer can appeal to the state commit-
tee.84 Again, there is a time limit of fifteen days within which
this appeal must be filed. 85 An informal hearing can be re-
quested.86 Because of the informal nature of the hearings,
however, witnesses are not sworn and the formal rules of evi-
dence do not apply.87 The producer can request that the pro-
ceedings be transcribed at his or her expense.88
3. Review by the National Appeals Division
Adverse decisions by the state committee are appealed to
the Director of the National Appeals Division (NAD) .89 The
fifteen day time period within which to appeal is also applica-
ble at this level.90 The Director of NAD makes a decision
based on a record developed and certified by a hearing exam-
iner employed by NAD. 9 t
Although technically categorized as informal, the procedure
for hearings before NAD is more formal than the lower pro-
ceedings. The director has the authority to issue subpoenas
and to take testimony under oath.92 The hearing is held in
Washington, D.C., although the producer has the option of
presenting his or her case by telephone.93 The NAD determi-
nation technically constitutes the final level in the appeal pro-
cess, although the Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator
of ASCS, the Executive Vice President of CCC or a designee
has the authority to reverse or modify any determination of the
83. 7 C.F.R. § 780.17(a) (1992).
84. 7 C.F.R. § 780.7(b) (1992).
85. 7 C.F.R. § 780.15(a) (1992).
86. 7 C.F.R. § 780.7(b) (1992).
87. 7 C.F.R. § 780.9(g) (1992).
88. 7 C.F.R. § 780.9(e) (1992).
89. 7 C.F.R. § 780.8 (1992).
90. 7 C.F.R. § 780.15(a) (1992).
91. 7 C.F.R. § 780.19(6), (7) (1992).
92. 7 C.F.R. § 780.19(a)(4) (1992).
93. Recently, the USDA developed a statement entitled Administrative Procedures
for National Appeals Division Hearings. This statement explains the procedures to be
followed in NAD appeal hearings and is now being incorporated in letters from NAD
to producers who have filed appeals with NAD from adverse state committee or
DASCO determinations.
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Director of the National Appeals Division. 4
While the ASCS administrative appeal process is concep-
tually simple, pitfalls are numerous. Two of the principal
problems involve the de novo nature of the appeal process at
each stage and the collaboration among the county, state, and
national offices.
Review at each succeeding level in the administrative review
process is de novo - the reviewing body looks at the case
anew, as if no previous decision has been made.95 While under
some circumstances this may be beneficial to the producer, it
presents some serious perils because it allows the reviewing
body to affirm an adverse determination on alternative, previ-
ously unrevealed grounds. Consequently, there will be some
uncertainty over the issues that will arise during the review.
Another problem that may confront the producer seeking
review of an adverse decision is the involvement of the higher
tiers in the initial determination. In many cases, particularly in
those that present novel issues, a county committee will seek
the advice of the state committee prior to making its initial de-
termination. The state, in turn, may seek direction from
DASCO. While this procedure may be beneficial to the overall
administration of the programs, it undercuts the objectivity of
the appeal process.
Consider, for example, the recent case of Doty v. United
States.96 In determining whether to fine Mr. Doty for alleged
violations of the Dairy Termination Program (DTP), the
county committee requested that the state ASCS office review
the file and make a recommendation or determination.97 The
state ASCS executive director, in turn, contacted DASCO for
guidance.98 The state executive director then told the county
committee how the case should be resolved. 99 In order to ex-
haust his administrative appeal rights, Mr. Doty then had to
seek reconsideration by the county committee, appeal the deci-
sion to the state committee, and finally appeal to DASCO. "o
94. 7 C.F.R. § 780.23 (1992).
95. 7 C.F.R. § 780.17(a) (1992).
96. 24 CI. Ct. 615 (1991). For a more detailed discussion of Doty, see infra notes
289-321 and the accompanying text.
97. Id. at 620.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 622-23.
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Not surprisingly, throughout the appeal the same determina-
tion was made.00 In the end, on judicial review, the Claims
Court held that DASCO abused its discretion in failing to call a
material witness requested by Mr. Doty.'
While the new appeals system arguably provides a more ob-
jective final level of review, the regulations expressly provide
that the Secretary, the ASCS Administrator, the Executive Vice
President of CCC, or a designee, such as DASCO, can over-
turn NAD decisions.10 3 This authority, even if not exercised,
combined with the inclusion of NAD within the ASCS, leaves
serious questions concerning the objectivity of the appeal
process.
B. Proposed Changes To The ASCS Appeal Process
OnJuly 31, 1992, Senators Conrad, Heflin, Daschle, Harkin,
Bumpers, Kerrey (Neb.) and Wellstone, and Representatives
Espy, Glickman, Johnson (S.D.) and Dooley introduced the
USDA National Appeals Division Act of 1992.104 If enacted,
the legislation will create an independent administrative ap-
peals division within the USDA, known as the National Appeals
Division (USDA NAD).10 5 The Director of USDA NAD will
make the USDA's final administrative decision on producer
appeals of ASCS, replacing the current NAD.' 0 6 In addition,
the new USDA NAD would hear appeals from CCC, FmHA,
Rural Development Administration (RDA), and SCS deter-
minations.
07
Currently, the ASCS, CCC, FmHA, RDA, and SCS have dif-
ferent administrative appeal systems, none of which are in-
dependent of the agency.' 0 The new legislation consolidates
the appeal systems for those agencies into one system at the
final level of the administrative appeal process. 0 9 The final
level in each agency's administrative appeal process will be
101. Doty, 24 Cl. Ct. at 622-23.
102. Id. at 629-32.
103. 7 C.F.R. § 780.23 (1992). See also 7 U.S.C. § 1433e(f) (Supp. III 1992).
104. S. 3119, H.R. 5742, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 7 C.F.R. pt. 780 (1992) (ASCS); 7 C.F.R. §§ 1900.51-1900.100 (1992)
(FmHA and RDA); 7 C.F.R. pt. 614 (1992) (SCS); see 7 C.F.R. §§ 1948.93, 1948.143
(1992) (providing that RDA appeals will be heard under the FmHA procedures).
109. S. 3119, H.R. 5742, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
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before the USDA NAD." ° The legislation, however, does not
alter the current appeal authority of ASCS county and state
committees. Moreover, it does not alter the authority of the
Secretary of Agriculture or the Administrator of ASCS or his
designee from granting equitable relief to the producer.
Addressing the criticism that the present system does not
provide objective review, the proposed legislation provides
that the Director of the USDA NAD "shall be free from the
direction and control of ... any person other than the Secre-
tary [of Agriculture].' It also provides that determinations
of USDA NAD "shall be administratively final, conclusive, and
binding on the relevant agency."' 12 Thus, under the proposed
legislation, the final administrative appeal authority will be in-
dependent of the agency involved.' 
1 3
In addition, the proposed legislation provides that final deci-
sions of the USDA NAD will be judicially reviewable under the
APA." 4 In essence, this means that the federal courts will be
directed to set aside any decisions that are arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law.'
The proposed legislation also repeals 7 U.S.C. sections 1385
and 1429.116 The 102d Congress did not report the legislation
out of committee, however, and it remains to be seen whether
the legislation or any variation of it will be enacted in the
103rd Congress.
C. Recent Cases Involving Judicial Review of ASCS Decisions
If a producer has exhausted his or her administrative reme-
dies, or if one of the exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine applies, most ASCS decisions may be judicially re-
viewed."' This section presents a brief summary of some of
the most significant judicial decisions involving federal farm
programs issued during the last year. These cases illustrate
110. Id.
111. S. 3119, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(3) (1992).
112. Id. § 7(h)(1).
113. Id.
114. Id. § 9 (referencing the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706).
115. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
116. S. 3119, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 16 (1992).
117. See generally Kelley & Harbison, A Guide, supra note 20, at 436-39, 470-72 (dis-
cussing the exhaustion of remedies requirement and issues of reviewability).
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some of the complex issues brought before the court in ASCS
judicial review actions.
1. Federal Court of Appeals Decisions
a. DCP Farms v. Yeutter
In DCP Farms v. Yeutter,1 8 the Fifth Circuit held that the dis-
trict court" 9 erred when it enjoined the national level of the
USDA, including DASCO, from participating in any determi-
nations or administrative appeals concerning the plaintiffs'
farm program eligibility. 20  The district court enjoined
DASCO's participation on the grounds that DASCO's initial
determination of the plaintiffs' ineligibility for program pay-
ments was "impermissibl[y] influence[d]" by Congressional in-
terference12 ' and that DASCO's participation in the
administrative review of that determination would violate the
plaintiffs' due process rights.
22
The district court found that it was "abundantly clear" that
Representative Jerry Huckaby, Chairman of the House Com-
mittee on Agriculture's Subcommittee on Cotton, Rice, and
Sugar, and his staff had used their influence in an effort to have
DASCO "adopt the conclusion" that the plaintiffs had adopted
a scheme or device to evade the farm program payment limita-
tions rules. 23 Specifically, the court noted that Representative
Huckaby had written the Secretary of Agriculture to advise him
that, "I feel strongly that the [plaintiffs'] operation violates
both the spirit and letter of the law," and, "[i]f the Department
is unable to correct this situation, it is my intention to enact
legislation making all trusts and estates ineligible for pay-
ments, beginning retroactively with the 1989 crop year." 124
In reversing the decision, the Fifth Circuit held that the dis-
trict court had erred in using the "mere appearance of bias"
standard adopted in Pillsbury Co. v. FTC.'25 The Fifth Circuit
ruled that the Pillsbury standard did not apply to claims of im-
proper congressional interference with an administrative de-
118. 957 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3061 (1992).
119. DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 761 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Miss. 1991).
120. DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1189.
121. DCP Farms, 761 F. Supp. at 1276.
122. Id. at 1273-74.
123. Id. at 1271, 1273-74.
124. Id. at 1271.
125. 354 F.2d 952, 964 (5th Cir. 1966).
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termination of eligibility for farm subsidies, so long as the
determination is neither quasi-judicial norjudicial. 126 Instead,
"the proper standard for evaluating congressional interference
with non-judicial decisions of administrative agencies is
whether the communication actually influenced the agency's
decision" by causing the administrator to consider extraneous
factors in reaching his decision.
1 2 7
The Fifth Circuit also ruled that the district court's reliance
on the Pillsbury standard was inappropriate because the con-
gressional contact at issue "occurred well before any proceed-
ing which could be considered judicial or quasi-judicial."'
128
Specifically, the court concluded that "[t]his case would not
have reached the stage when it could fairly be called adjudica-
tive or quasi-judicial until the hearing [on the plaintiffs' re-
quest for reconsideration]," a hearing which was never held
because the plaintiffs sought judicial relief before the sched-
uled hearing when they were unsuccessful in recusing the
USDA's national office.'
29
In applying the "intrusion of extraneous factors into the
consideration" standard, the Fifth Circuit's characterization of
Representative Huckaby's motivations sharply diverged from
the district court's. For example, while the district court found
that Representative Huckaby's actions were "an effort to dic-
tate the outcome" of the plaintiffs' application for program
payments, 30 the Fifth Circuit concluded "[t]hat a congressman
expresses the view that the law ought not sanction the use of
fifty-one irrevocable trusts to gain $1.4 million in subsidies is
not impermissible political 'pressure.' It certainly injects no
extraneous factor."'1
3'
In the Fifth Circuit's view, "Congressman Huckaby was con-
cerned about the administration of a congressionally created
program," and "[the dispute between the USDA and DCP
Farms was part of a larger policy debate."'13 2 From that per-
spective, the Fifth Circuit reasoned "that the force of logic and
126. DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1187-88.
127. Id. at 1188, (citing Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
714 F.2d 163, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
128. Id. at 1187.
129. Id.
130. DCP Farms, 761 F. Supp. at 1274.
131. DCP Farms, 957 F.2d at 1188.
132. Id. at 1187.
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ideas is not our concern. They carry their own force and exert
their own pressure. In this practical sense they are not extra-
neous." 1'3 The Fifth Circuit also held that the plaintiffs were
not excused from exhausting their administrative remedies be-
cause they had neither challenged the lawfulness or constitu-
tionality of the administrative process nor had they produced
evidence sufficient to support a finding of futility. 3 4 Finding
that the USDA was justified in summarily rejecting the plain-
tiffs' "unreasonably broad" request for the recusal of the na-
tional level of the USDA, the court concluded that the USDA's
denial of the request "does not convince us that the USDA
would have unreasonably refused a request for a different
hearing officer had DCP Farms made such a request," and "ev-
idence that [the] hearing officer [appointed to review the de-
terminations had] read a letter involving this case is weak
evidence that pursuing administrative appeals would have
been futile."'
' 3 5
Characterizing the relief granted by the district court as "ex-
ceptional," the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated "[t]he ap-
propriate forum for resolving this dispute is an appeal from a
final USDA decision." 136 It ordered the dismissal of the dis-
trict court action.
b. National Wildlife Fed'n v. ASCS
National Wildlife Fed'n v. ASCS is7 involved a challenge to
ASCS's authority to issue a "good faith exemption" from the
"swampbuster" provisions of the Food Security Act.'3 8 The
challenge was brought by an environmental organization, the
National Wildlife Federation (NWF), that had submitted affida-
vits from members who resided in the wetlands area at issue
and who enjoyed the recreational use and the aesthetic beauty
of the wetlands.' 3 9 The court held that the NWF had proper
standing to pursue its challenge. 4 °
133. Id. at 1188.
134. Id. at 1188-89.
135. Id. at 1189.
136. DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1183, 1189 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61
U.S.L.W. 3061 (1992).
137. 955 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1992).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1203.
140. National Wildlife Fed'n, 955 F.2d at 1203-04, (citing National Wildlife Fed'n v.
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On the issue of the good faith exemption, the court deter-
mined that although the lawsuit challenged the authority for
the exemption at the time it was initially granted, since that
time, Congress has specifically enacted a retroactive provision
authorizing such an exemption.' 4 ' Accordingly, the court re-
manded the case to the district court for reconsideration as to
whether the exemption fell within the guidelines contained in
the new provision. 1
42
c. Doko Farms v. United States
Doko Farms v. United States' 43 represents another chapter in a
continuing, twelve year struggle between several Texas farm-
ers and the USDA.' 44 The primary issue in the case was
whether an earlier finding that the government's claim was
barred by the statute of limitations precluded the government
from exercising administrative offset. 45 The court held that
the bar imposed by the statute of limitations only prevents a
suit for money damages. 46 The bar does not extinguish the
debt, and it does not prevent recovering overpayments by ad-
ministratively offsetting future payments.
47
2. Federal District Court Decisions
a. Hanson v. Madigan
In Hanson v. Madigan,'48 the district court reversed the ASCS
denial of disaster payments to Christian and Evan Hanson.
49
At issue was the ASCS interpretation of the eligibility criteria
under the Disaster Assistance Act of 1988.150
The Act imposed a $100,000 limitation on the amount of
ASCS, 901 F.2d 673, 675-77 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Coalition for the Env't v.
Volpe, 504 F.2d 156, 167 (8th Cir. 1974))).
141. National Wildlife Fed'n, 955 F.2d at 1204-05 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 3822(h)(1)
(1990)).
142. Id. at 1206.
143. 956 F.2d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1137-38.
146. Id. at 1141.
147. Id.
148. 788 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
149. Id. at 405.
150. Id. at 404, See generally PUB. L. No. 100-387, §§ 201-41, 102 Stat. 933-945
(1988) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1421 note §§ 201-44 (1988)) [hereinafter
The Act].
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disaster benefits that any "person" could receive and directed
the Secretary of Agriculture to define "person" for this pur-
pose. 15' The Act also set forth eligibility requirements, limit-
ing benefits to producers whose "qualifying gross revenues"
do not exceed $2,000,000 annually.' 52 The Act further pro-
vided that for purposes of computing "qualifying gross reve-
nues," if a majority of the producer's annual income for the
previous year was received from farming, only the gross reve-
nues from farming were to be included.'- 3 If, on the other
hand, less than a majority of the producer's income was re-
ceived from farming, the producer's gross revenues were com-
puted from all sources of revenue.' 54 According to the court,
the regulations promulgated by the Secretary mirrored this
method of computation.
55
Applying the statute and the regulations to the Hanson's ap-
plication for assistance, ASCS determined that less than a ma-
jority of the Hanson's income from the previous year was
derived from farming.'15  Therefore, computation of their
"qualifying gross revenue" was to include all of their income,
from both farming and nonfarming sources.' 57 ASCS went a
step further, however, and included not only the personal
gross revenues of the Hansons, but also included the gross
revenues of the corporations controlled by the Hansons.15 1
ASCS based this analysis on the definition of "person," finding
that, for payment limitation purposes, the corporation and
each of the Hanson individuals could not qualify as "separate
persons."159
The court rejected the ASCS's interpretation as inconsistent
with the provisions of the Act and the regulations. 60 In re-
sponse to the argument that the agency's interpretation should
be given deference, the court noted that "deference is due
only when the... interpretation is based on a permissible con-
151. Id. at 407 (citing The Act at § 211(a),(d)).
152. Hanson v. Madigan, 788 F. Supp. 403, 407 (citing The Act at § 231(a)).
153. Id. (citing The Act at § 231(b)(1)).
154. Id. at 407 (citing The Act at § 231(b)(2)).
155. Id. at 408-09 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 14 77.3(g)(1989)).
156. Id. at 406.
157. Hanson v. Madigan, 788 F. Supp. 403, 406 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
158. Id. at 405.
159. Id. at 408-09.
160. Id. at 409.
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struction of the... statute."' 6 ' The court held that the Secre-
tary's combination of the Hansons and the corporation as one
"person" was "not supported by the directives of the Act."' 162
The Hanson court also noted that ASCS's denial of the Han-
son's benefits was "so lacking in explanation as to be arbitrary
on its face and unreviewable," criticizing the lack of basis for
the findings in the record. 63 In addition, the court flatly re-
jected the argument that it was constitutionally prohibited
from ordering the government to make payment, stating that
"it hardly merits discussion."' ' The court granted the Han-
son's motion for summary judgment and ordered the govern-
ment to make the requested disaster payments. 165 The Hanson
case is presently on appeal to the Seventh Circuit. 166
b. Vandervelde v. Yeutter
Vandervelde v. Yeutter 1'67 concerned the DTP 68 under which
farmers contracted with the government, agreeing to dispose
of their dairy herds and stop milk production in exchange for
payments. 69 The ASCS county committee had determined
that the plaintiffs had breached their duties under the DTP
contract. 70 This determination was based primarily on an in-
vestigative report prepared by an agent of the Inspector Gen-
eral's Office at the USDA. 17 1 On appeal, both the state
committee and DASCO affirmed the findings of the investiga-
tive report. 72 At no time, however, was the agent who pre-
pared the report called to testify. 173 The Vanderveldes did not
have an opportunity to cross examine the agent or to depose
other witnesses identified in the report. 174 The final DASCO
161. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
162. Hanson v. Madigan, 788 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
163. Id. at 409-10.
164. Id. at 410.
165. Id.
166. Appeal docketed, No. 92-1918 (7th Cir. Apr. 20, 1992).
167. 789 F. Supp. 24 (D.D.C. 1992).
168. 7 U.S.C. § 1446(d)(3)(7) (1988).
169. Vandervelde, 789 F. Supp. at 24 (referring to facts set forth in Vandervelde v.
Yeutter, 774 F. Supp. 645 (D.D.C. 1991)).
170. Vandervelde, 774 F.Supp. at 646.
171. Id. at 647.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.; see also Vandervelde, 789 F.Supp. at 25-26.
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decision failed to include any findings of fact. 17 5
On review of the administrative record, the district court
found that the "administrative hearings were not conducted in
the manner deemed most likely to obtain the facts."' 176 The
court noted that the record was "replete with hearsay" and
"plausible allegations of intimidation" of potential witnesses,
with interference alleged by both sides.' 77 For these reasons,
the court vacated the final DASCO determination and re-
manded the case back to DASCO for another hearing.'7 " The
court further held that the new decision would be appealable
to the newly formed National Appeals Division, where sub-
poena power would clearly allow the examination under oath
of all witnesses.
79
c. Peterson Farms I v. Madigan
At issue in Peterson Farms I v. Madigan,'"0 a payment limita-
tions case, was the jurisdiction of the district court.'' The
plaintiffs, four farming partnerships, sought judicial review of
the final ASCS administrative determination in district
court.' 8 2 The partnerships requested a declaratory judgment
for an entitlement to funds owed them. 8 3 The government
challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the United
States Claims Court had exclusive jurisdiction over their
claims.' 84  The court analyzed the distinctions between
"money damages" and "monetary relief."'' 8 5 Even though the
plaintiffs admitted that they did not seek another administra-
tive hearing, did not expressly seek future benefits, and did not
disavow "an interest in a sum certain", the court held that the
plaintiffs sought monetary relief, not money damages. 8 6 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that while awards of money damages
175. Vandervelde v. Yeutter, 774 F. Supp. 645, 647 (D.D.C. 1991)).
176. Vanderuelde, 789 F. Supp. at 25.
177. Id. at 25-26.
178. Id. at 27.
179. Id. at 26-27.
180. 782 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991).
181. Id. at 3-4.
182. Id. at 1-2.
183. Id. at 2.
184. Id. at 3.
185. Peterson Farms, 782 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 1991) (citing Bowen v. Massachu-
setts, 487 U.S. 879, 891-905 (1988) and Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 981-85 (D.C.
Cir. 1989)).
186. Id. at 3-4.
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over $10,000 against the government must be litigated before
the claims court, claims for monetary relief are within the juris-
diction of the district court.8 7 The Peterson case, however, was
recently dismissed by the district court on the government's
subsequent motion for summary judgment.'
d. United States v. Goode
The defendant in United States v. Goode,' 9 Paul Goode, par-
ticipated in the Milk Diversion Program. 90 The government
alleged that Mr. Goode violated the terms of the program by
including certain cows in his base of production and then
transferring those cows to another farm.' 9 ' Because of this al-
leged violation, ASCS determined that Mr. Goode was no
longer eligible for continued participation in the program and
that he must repay the moneys paid to him.' 92 The govern-
ment sued to recover those payments already made. 9 3 Mr.
Goode denied any violation of the contract and specifically de-
nied that the transferred cows were his or that they were ever
part of his base for calculating production under the pro-
gram.' 94 Additionally, Mr. Goode alleged that he relied on er-
roneous advice received from ASCS.' 95 Accordingly, he
counterclaimed, seeking review of the final ASCS determina-
tion rendered by DASCO. 196
On the government's motion for summary judgment, the
court held that the government had "wholly failed to show"
that the cows were included in Mr. Goode's base, and the mo-
tion was summarily denied.' 97 On the issue of Mr. Goode's
counterclaims, the court rejected the government's argument
that the claims court had exclusive jurisdiction, concluding
that because Mr. Goode asked the court to construe the pro-
gram contract and assess his compliance therewith, the federal
187. Id. at 4.
188. Peterson Farms I v. Madigan, No. 91-2340UJHG), 1992 WL 118370 at 1
(D.D.C. May 20, 1992).
189. 781 F. Supp. 704 (D. Kan. 1991).
190. 7 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (1988).
191. Goode, 781 F.Supp. at 705.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 707.
196. United States v. Goode, 781 F. Supp. 704, 705 (D. Kan. 1991).
197. Id. at 708.
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district court had proper jurisdiction. 9 '
The court, however, denied Mr. Goode's final claim of es-
toppel against the government. 99 The court found that Mr.
Goode had apparently based his argument on the ASCS rule
which provides that otherwise unacceptable "performance ren-
dered in good faith in reliance upon action or advice" of an
ASCS representative may be permitted. 20 0 The court con-
strued Mr. Goode's sole reliance on this regulation as a "con-
cession of the general rule precluding estoppel against the
government .... ,201 On this basis, the court granted the gov-
ernment's motion for summary judgment, but allowed Mr.
Goode to seek review of the agency's exercise of its discretion-
ary authority under the ASCS rule. 2
e. Golightly v. Yeutter
In Golightly v. Yeutter,2 °3 the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of three cotton producers, who had been
combined as one "person" for 1987 and 1988 payment limita-
tion purposes by DASCO. 2 4 The court found the agency's ac-
tions arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion and
entered a declaratory judgment entitling each producer to be
treated as a separate "person" for the years at issue.20 5
DASCO found that one of the plaintiffs, Regis Land Corpo-
ration, a cotton gin, violated certain financing prohibitions by
lending money to cotton producers and thus was not consid-
ered a separate person for payment limitation purposes.20 6
The plaintiffs countered that Regis' activities fell within an ex-
emption for "[i]nstitutions established to provide commercial
credit to individuals or entities. '20 7 The government, in turn,
argued that there was a "bright line rule" that limited this ex-
emption to "lenders in the business of banking," and that Re-
198. Id. at 708-10.
199. Id. at 710-11.
200. Goode, 781 F. Supp. at 710 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 790.2).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 710 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 790.2).
203. 780 F. Supp. 672 (D. Ariz. 1991).
204. Id. at 679. "Person" determinations in 1987 and 1988 were governed by the
payment limitation rules found at 7 C.F.R. pt. 795 (1987).
205. Id. at 679.
206. Id. at 678.
207. Id. at 677 (citing ASCS Handbook 5-CM (Rev. 1)).
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gis did not qualify as such a lender.2 0 ' The court, however,
noted that the government was unable to cite to any written
interpretation, even unpublished, to support the existence of
the "bright line rule."'2 0 9 Thus, the court found the "rule" to
be "no more than a post-hoc rationalization of DASCO's appli-
cation of the financing prohibition . . . rather than an official
agency rule or guideline. 2 1 0 On this basis, the court found
that DASCO's refusal to apply the exception for financing in-
stitutions to Regis was arbitrary and capricious.2 I '
The Golightly court also rejected the government's argument
that the producer financing was really provided by Regis'
shareholders, who also had an interest in the land as land-
lords.21 2 The court stated that "absent an action to pierce the
corporate veil, the corporate form ... must be honored.
2 1 3
The court noted that "DASCO appears to have misunderstood
or ignored" certain facts concerning the relationships of the
parties to each other and to the corporation.2 14
Finally, the court concluded that DASCO abused its discre-
tion in granting full relief to other similarly situated producers
under the equitable relief provisions while denying relief to
one of the plaintiffs, the Tiffany Farms partnership.21 5 The
court rejected the government's argument that DASCO's exer-
cise of discretion in granting or denying equitable relief is be-
yond judicial review. 6 The court held that "where an agency
discriminates among similarly situated producers under these
provisions, the agency's discretion is circumscribed by the re-
quirement that some reasonable basis be shown for such dis-
crimination. ' 217 In the present case, the court could find no
such reasonable basis and, accordingly, held that DASCO had
abused its discretion.21 8 The court granted the plaintiffs' mo-
tion for summary judgment and ordered that the plaintiffs be
208. Golightly v. Yeutter, 780 F. Supp. 672, 677 (D. Ariz. 1991).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 679.
212. Id. at 678.
213. Golightly v. Yeutter, 780 F. Supp. 672, 678 (D. Ariz. 1991).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 678-79 (referring to 7 C.F.R. §§ 790.2, 791.2).
216. Id. at 678-79.
217. Id. at 679, (citing Hilo Coast Processing Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 629,
634 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
218. Golightly v. Yeutter, 780 F. Supp. 672, 679 (D. Ariz. 1991).
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treated as three separate persons for purposes of payment lim-
itations for the 1987 and 1988 crop years.219
3. United States Claims Court Decisions
a. Simons v. United States
At issue in Simons v. United States220 was a farmer's objection
to an ASCS determination that he was not entitled to payments
under the DTP because he violated certain branding require-
ments. 22' The farmer sought judicial review of the final
DASCO decision in the Claims Court alleging breach of con-
tract and requesting full payment of the DTP proceeds.222
The Claims Court, however, construed sections 1385 and
1429 of 7 U.S.C. as substantially restricting the scope of judi-
cial review of final DASCO decisions. 2 3 The court held that
section 1385 precluded it from reviewing the factual findings
of the agency and limited its review of the legal conclusions to
determining whether DASCO acted rationally, given the facts
found by the agency.224 The Claims Court ruled that "both
the literal language of section 1385 and the consistent case au-
thority constituting binding precedent for the Claims Court re-
quire a holding that factual findings of DASCO are simply
unreviewable under any standard, however narrow, or for any
reason, however compelling, 'when officially determined in
conformity with the applicable regulations.' "225
The Court also held that section 1429 limited review to the
issue of whether DASCO acted rationally, and that "the ration-
ality review permitted despite [section] 1429 is lawfully limited
to a comparison of an administrator's decision with the facts
219. Id. The district court subsequently denied the plaintiffs' application for an
award of attorneys fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2412, holding that the defendant's positions "at least had a reasonable basis
in fact or law" and, as such, "were substantially justified." Golightly v. Yeutter, No. CIV
90-1272-PHX-RCB, slip op. at 5 (D. Ariz. July 2, 1992), appeal docketed, No. 92-16591
(9th Cir. Sept. 3, 1992). It did so despite having previously entered judgment in the
case with the finding that defendant's conduct was "not substantially justified." Golightly
v. Yeutter, No. 90-1272-PHX-RCB, slip op. at 2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 1992) (emphasis
added).
220. 25 Cl. Ct. 685 (1992).
221. Id. (interpreting the DTP provisions at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1446(d)(3)-(7) (West
1988)).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 687 (interpreting 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1385, 1429).
224. Id. at 697.
225. Simons v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 685, 697 (1992) (citing 7 U.S.C. § 1385).
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found by him."22 6 In other words, the "test for rationality
must be conducted by comparing DASCO's legal conclusions
and ultimate determination with the facts found by him rather
than with the entire record.
227
b. Gratz v. United States
In Gratz v. United States, 228 the Claims Court upheld an ASCS
decision to order delivery of a Wisconsin producer's collateral
securing a Farm Storage Grain Reserve note and security
agreement. 229 In so doing, the court rejected a host of consti-
tutional and other challenges to the ASCS's actions.230
BetweenJanuary 1982, and December 1987,James and The-
rese Gratz stored corn under thirteen grain reserve nonre-
course loan contracts.23 ' Under the agreements, the Gratzs
were responsible for any loss in the stored corn's quality and
quantity.23 2
Following a series of inconsistent quality evaluations, some
of which rated the corn as "satisfactory", the county ASCS
committee demanded delivery of the stored corn "due to un-
authorized disposition, corn quality, passed due maturity
dates, and lack of storage agreements. 233 Ultimately, the
county committee's decision to call the loans was affirmed on
appeal by the ASCS state committee and DASCO.23 4 DASCO,
however, "restored any loan which 'was not called due to dete-
riorating condition.' "235
Before the Claims Court, the Gratzs raised numerous issues,
including the claim that the Farm Storage Loan worksheet
Form 677-1 used by the county committee did not use the
grade terminology that is used in the Federal Grain Inspection
Service (FGIS) standards.23 6 Although the Claims Court ac-
knowledged that the grain storage regulations required the use
of FGIS standards in making grain quality determinations and
226. Id. at 698.
227. Id. at 699.
228. 25 CI. Ct. 411 (1992).
229. Id. at 418-19.
230. Id. at 419-20.
231. Id. at 414.
232. Id.
233. Gratz v. United States, 25 C1. Ct. 411, 417 (1992).
234. Id. at 418.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 418-19.
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that "it was unclear whether the ASCS inspectors used FGIS
criteria in assessing plaintiffs' corn," the court concluded that
the county committee had "acted on the totality of those in-
spections, looking beyond the 'satisfactory' rating." '23 7 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the ASCS had acted rationally,
notwithstanding the "satisfactory" ratings for most of the
contracts.238
The court also rejected the Gratzs' contention that they were
entitled to an appeal hearing before the ASCS called their
loans and demanded delivery of the grain. The court held that
the post-demand administrative appeal process under 7 C.F.R.
pt. 780 satisfied the Gratzs' due process rights. 239 Finally, the
court held the ASCS's actions did not constitute a "taking"
under the Due Process Clause because the government was
acting in a proprietary capacity, not as a sovereign under the
loan program. 4 °
c. Bar 9 Farms, Inc. v. United States
Bar 9 Farms, Inc. v. United States24' was brought in response to
a DASCO determination that combined the individual, trust
and corporate plaintiffs into two "persons" under the then-ap-
plicable payment limitation rules. 42 The plaintiffs challenged
DASCO's determination in the Claims Court seeking money
damages for breach of contract.243 The court affirmed the
DASCO determination and granted the government's motion
for summary judgment.
2 44
The court rejected the plaintiffs' primary argument that the
237. Id.
238. Gratz v. United States, 25 CI.Ct. 411, 419 (1992) (citing Frank's Livestock &
Poultry Farm v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 601, 606 (1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 1515 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) which held that "questions as to grain quality... are peculiarly within the
expertise of [the ASCS]")).
239. Id. at 420, (citing Frank's Livestock & Poultry Farm v. United States, 17 Cl.
Ct. 601, 606 (1989) (holding that "subsequent hearings provided at the county, state
and federal levels satisfy any applicable due process requirement" in the absence of
prescriptive appeal hearing regulations)).
240. Id.
241. 25 Cl. Ct. 392 (1992).
242. Id. at 393. The case was decided under the payment limitation rules applica-
ble to the pre-1989 crop years. 7 C.F.R. pt. 795 (1987). Beginning with the 1989
crop year, the payment limitation rules applicable to most federal farm programs are
found at 7 C.F.R. pt. 1497 (1992).
243. Id. at 395.
244. Id. at 399.
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plaintiff's membership in a farm partnership excluded them
from the regulations applicable to individuals.245 On the con-
trary, the court held that the "person" status of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders was the controlling issue.2 46 The
corporate regulations require that in order for a stockholder to
be considered a "separate person," the stockholder must com-
ply with the individual regulations.2 47
In Bar 9 Farms, the plaintiffs sold equipment to the corpora-
tion and deferred the sale proceeds, which the court equated
to financing the corporation. 248 Finding that the "separate
person" regulation had been violated, the court held that
the individuals were appropriately combined with the
corporation.249
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the fam-
ily member financing exception authorized the deferred fi-
nancing. 25 0 The court held that the exception was "intended
to allow interfamily financial cooperation" and as such did not
apply to loans made to corporations.2 5'
The plaintiffs presented four additional arguments that were
also rejected by the court. First, in response to the argument
that the amount of the deferred financing was insignificant, the
court disagreed with the assertion and noted that the plaintiffs
had failed to provide authority for such an exception. 25 2 Sec-
ond, the court rejected the contention that because stockhold-
ers can sign for loans to corporations, they should also be
allowed to make loans to corporations.25 3 Third, the plaintiffs
argued that because the farmland was purchased in 1987, a
substantive change in the farming operation occurred which
justified an increase in the number of "persons. ' 254 The court
disagreed and held that, even if a substantive change had oc-
245. Id. at 395-96 (referring to 7 C.F.R. § 795.3 (1987)).
246. Bar 9 Farms, Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 392, 397 (1992) (referring to 7
C.F.R. § 795.8 (1987)). The corporation issue distinguished the present action from
Stegall v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 765 (1990) (evaluating legitimate partnership in-
terests as separate persons).
247. Id. at 397 (referring to 7 C.F.R. § 795.8 (1987) which refers to 7 C.F.R.
§ 795.3 (1987) regarding individual shareholders).
248. Id. at 397 (referring to 7 C.F.R. § 795.3 (1987)).
249. Id. (referring to 7 C.F.R. §§ 795.3, 795.8 (1987)).
250. Id. at 397-98 (referring to 7 C.F.R. § 795.4 (1987)).
251. Bar 9 Farms, Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 392, 397-98 (1992).
252. Id. at 398.
253. Id. at 399.
254. Id. at 398.
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curred, the plaintiffs still had to meet the separate person
guidelines.255 Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs' argument
that because the financing arrangement did not affect the tax
status of their subchapter S corporation, it should not effect
their separate person status.256
d. Schultz v. United States
In Schultz v. United States,257 Donald and Beverly Schultz, and
Don Schultz Farms, Inc., a Washington State corporation,
challenged the ASCS's determination that they were one "per-
son" for the 1986 crop year. 25 a Prior to 1986, Don Schultz
Farms, Inc. operated two farms.259 One, the Davenport farm,
was owned by the corporation. 260 The other, the Landt farm,
was leased by the corporation. 26' Donald and Beverly Schultz
owned all of the stock in Don Schultz Farms, Inc.262 Accord-
ingly, under the majority stockholder rule, the Schultzs and
their corporation had been combined as one "person" for the
2631985 crop year.
Prior to the 1986 payment limitation deadline, the Schultzs
transferred twenty five percent of their interest in the corpora-
tion to each of their two daughters, for a total of fifty per-
cent. 264 At the time, both daughters were full-time college
students.265 After the transfer, Mr. and Mrs. Schultz individu-
ally leased and farmed the Landt farm that had been leased by
their corporation in 1985.266 They leased the necessary equip-
ment from the corporation.2 67 The corporation continued to
operate the Davenport farm.268
Based on the transfer of the corporate interests to the
255. Id. at 398-99.
256. Bar 9 Farns, Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 392, 399 (1992).
257. 25 Cl. Ct. 384 (1992).
258. Id. at 385. In 1986, "person" determinations for federal farm program pay-
ment limitation purposes were governed by the rules found at 7 C.F.R. pt. 795
(1986). Id. at 386.
259. Id. at 387.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Schultz v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 384, 387 (1992).
263. Id. at 386-87 (referring to 7 C.F.R. § 795.8 (1987)).
264. Id. at 387.
265. Schultz, 25 Cl. Ct. at 387.
266. Id.
267. Schultz v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 384, 387 (1992).
268. Id.
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daughters, the Schultzs requested that for the 1986 crop year
ASCS increase their "person" status from one to four.
269
Although the county committee initially approved the request,
it subsequently combined the Schultzs and the corporation
into one "person" because there was "no substantive change
in the operation, [sic] it is the same individuals farming the
same land with the same equipment as the [previous year]. 270
On administrative appeal, the county committee's determina-
tion was upheld by DASCO.2 7 '
The then-applicable regulations permitted program partici-
pants to increase the number of "persons" eligible for separate
payment limits if the change in farming operations was "bona
fide and substantive. 2 72 However, the regulations provided
that "any document representing a ... transfer ... [of prop-
erty] which is fictitious or not legally binding as between the
parties thereto shall be considered to be for the purpose of
evading the payment limitation and shall be disregarded for
the purpose of applying the payment limitation.
' 271
In making its determination, ASCS relied on portions of the
ASCS Handbook, volumes 5-PA and 5-CM.274 As amended in
1985, 5-PA states that "[c]hanges [in farming operations] that
are not substantive include 'paper' changes in which the same
individuals or other entities continue to farm the same land,
with the same equipment. '2 75 In May 1986, 5-PA was replaced
with 5-CM. 76 As amended in August 1986, after Donald and
Beverly Schultz had transferred fifty percent of the corporate
interests to their daughters, 5-CM provided that a "substan-
tive" change included "[o]wnership of equipment changing
from the existing individual or entity to the new individual or
entity by gift or sale, with no arrangement to owe the original
ownership for the equipment.
277
As characterized by the Claims Court, the dispute
"center[ed] around the 'same people' and the 'same equip-
269. Id.
270. Id. at 387-88 (citation omitted).
271. Id. at 388.
272. 7 C.F.R. § 795.14(a) (1986).
273. Id. See also 7 C.F.R. § 795.14(b) (1992) (setting forth noninclusive examples
of "substantive" changes).
274. Schultz, 25 Ci. Ct. at 386-87.
275. Id. at 386 (quoting ASCS Handbook, 5-PA, 399(D)(1985)).
276. Id. at 387.
277. Id. at 387 (quoting ASCS Handbook, 5-CM, 81(C)(4)(1986)).
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ment' determinations."2 78 The Schultz's argued that, because
"different persons" were farming the two farms in the 1985
and 1986 crop years, it was "arbitrary and capricious" for
DASCO to conclude otherwise. 279 They also contended that
they had no prior notice that the equipment leasing agreement
they had made with the corporation would be proscribed in the
subsequently issued ASCS Handbook 5-CM.28 0 They alleged
that this abscence of notice violated the APA as well as their
due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.281 In upholding ASCS's "same person"
determination, the Claims Court, without citing any other au-
thority, concluded that "[a] change is substantive when a
meaningful break from the past has occurred. '282 The court
concluded that the change in the corporation's stockholders
was not such an event. 8 3
The Claims Court also upheld ASCS's "same equipment"
determination, rejecting the Schultzs' argument that they did
not have prior notice that ASCS would deem their leasing of
equipment from the corporation to not constitute a "substan-
tive" change.284 In support of its decision, the court provided
three reasons. First, the court reasoned that the regulation
placed the Schultzs on notice that a "substantive" change was
required.28 5 Second, the court found that the "same equip-
ment" provision in ASCS Handbook 5-PA gave sufficient notice,
notwithstanding the more specific proscription in the subse-
quently issued ASCS Handbook 5-CM. 286 Finally, the court
found that the provisions of 5-CM were sufficiently similar to
the comparable provisions in 5-PA so as to be "interpretive in
nature. '28 7 The provisions were thus "exempt from the notice
and comment requirements of the APA.
' '28 1
278. Id. at 389.
279. Schultz v. United States, 25 C1. Ct. 384, 388 (1992).
280. Id. at 389.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 389.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 392.
285. Schultz v. United States, 25 CI. Ct. 384, 391 (1992) (referring to 7 C.F.R.
§ 795.14 (1986)).
286. Id. at 389.
287. Id. at 392.
288. Id.
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e. Doty v. United States
In Doty v. United States, 289 the Claims Court held that the fail-
ure of DASCO to call a material witness requested by the ag-
grieved farmer at his appeal hearing was an abuse of
discretion.29 ° Implicitly recognizing the significance of its de-
cision, the court expressly limited its holding to the special cir-
cumstances of this case and cautioned that its holding did "not
suggest that a reviewing authority must grant every request by
a participant to call and cross-examine witnesses. "291
At issue in Doty v. United States was James Doty's eligibility for
DTP payments. 29 2 Mr. Doty alleged that ASCS's failure to
make the payments due under his DTP contract and the gov-
ernment's demand for a refund of payments previously paid
constituted a breach of contract.29 3 Additionally, Doty con-
tended that he had been denied due process during his admin-
istrative appeals.29 4
Doty operated a dairy farm in Minnesota and employed a
herdsman to help care for the cows. 295 The herdsman kept
heifers of his own on Doty's farm and elsewhere.29 6 The piv-
otal issue in the dispute was the number of the herdsman's
heifers located on Doty's farm on or after January 1, 1986.297
The applicable regulations required that DTP participants in-
clude in their contracts all cattle located on their farm on or
after January 1, 1986, and that all cattle subject to the contract
be destroyed .2 9  Also at issue were the branding requirements
necessary to insure the animals' destruction.29 9
The county committee received conflicting testimony re-
garding the destruction and branding of the cattle, including
testimony against Mr. Doty by his herdsman.3 0 0 Based on the
unsworn testimony of the herdsman, which contradicted his
previous statements, the county committee determined that
289. 24 C1. Ct. 615 (1991).
290. Id. at 631.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 616 (referring to 7 U.S.C. § 1446(d)(3)-(7) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
293. Id. at 616.
294. Doty v. United States, 24 CI. Ct. 615, 616-17 (1991).
295. Id. at 617.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 618.
298. Id.
299. Doty v. United States, 24 CI. Ct. 615, 617-18, 619 n.8. (1991).
300. Id. at 619.
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Doty should refund the previously paid DTP payments."0 '
Nevertheless, when it informed Doty of its determination, the
county committee neither provided Doty with a copy of the
herdsman's written statement nor did it make clear to him "the
precise allegations against him.' '302
Doty appealed the county committee's determination to the
state committee.3 0 3 Although the state committee gave Doty's
attorney a copy of the written statement prior to the hearing, it
refused Doty's request that the herdsman be present and sub-
ject to examination at the hearing. 0 4
At the hearing, Doty submitted an affidavit and a statement
from two persons with knowledge of the destruction and
branding of the cattle. 0 5 The Claims Court noted that each
statement contradicted material parts of the herdsman's writ-
ten statement and, when coupled with other information in the
administrative record, refuted the written statement. 0 6 With-
out advising Doty of its reasons for doing so, the state commit-
tee denied Doty's appeal and increased the penalties assessed
by the county committee. 0 7 Doty appealed the state commit-
tee's determination to DASCO.3 °s
Prior to his hearing before DASCO, Doty submitted addi-
tional documents challenging the accuracy of the herdsman's
written statement.3 0 9 A telephone hearing was conducted, but
DASCO refused to call the herdsman as a witness notwith-
standing Doty's request that he be present.3 10 DASCO denied
the appeal on the grounds that Doty had violated regulations
proscribing false representations of fact and false statements as
to the number of cattle sold for slaughter.1 1
After concluding that it had jurisdiction to review DASCO's
decision under the Tucker Act3 1 2 and the Commodity Credit
301. Id. at 620.
302. Id. at 621.
303. Id.
304. Doty v. United States, 24 CI. Ct. 615, 617-18, 621 (1991).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 622.
307. Id. at 622.
308. Id.
309. Doty v. United States, 24 CI. Ct. 615, 622 (1991).
310. Id. at 623, 630.
311. Id. at 623.
312. Id. at 623 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)).
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Charter Act, 3s 3 the Claims Court addressed Doty's argument
that a de novo review standard applied because the action in-
volved a breach of contract.3 14 In rejecting that argument and
finding that the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) stan-
dards of review applied,3 15 the court held that when Doty "en-
tered into the DTP contract, he agreed to be bound by the
statutory and regulatory framework governing the dairy termi-
nation program which effectively limited the availability of de
novo judicial review over a claim for breach of contract.
3 1 6
Turning to Doty's due process claims, the Claims Court re-
jected Doty's argument that the APA's formal adjudication re-
quirements applied to the administrative appeal process.3 17
The court also noted that it "was not persuaded" that Doty's
allegations rose to the level of constitutional due process
claims, but that it would avoid addressing the constitutional
issue because another means of resolving the dispute was
available. 1 8
The court accepted Doty's argument that DASCO had
abused its discretion with regard to conducting the administra-
tive appeal.3 9 The regulations give reviewing authorities the
discretion to "request or permit persons other than those ap-
pearing on behalf of the participant to present information or
evidence at such hearing and, in such event, [to] permit the
participant to question such persons. '320 The court noted
that:
[i]n a case such as this where there are conflicting versions
of the facts and testimony which is in direct conflict, in or-
der to discern the truth as accurately as possible, agency
discretion to permit or deny cross-examination of a pivotal
witness is subject to abuse to a much greater extent than in
most other aspects of informal hearings.
3 2 1
313. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 714b(c)).
314. Doty v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 615, 624 (1991).
315. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
316. Doty, 24 CI. Ct. at 626 (footnote omitted).
317. Id. at 627-28 (referring to 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557, 7 C.F.R. pt. 780, and 7
U.S.C. § 1446 (d)(5)(B)(i)).
318. Id. at 628-29.
319. Id. at 630.
320. Id. (citing 7 C.F.R. § 780.8(c), which has subsequently been amended to ap-
pear at 7 C.F.R. § 780.9(g) (1992)).
321. Doty v. United States, 24 CI. Ct. 615, 630 (1991).
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f Rivercrest v. United States
Rivercrest v. United States' 2 involved review of a DASCO deci-
sion denying disaster payments. 3 ASCS determined that the
farmers were ineligible because the late planting of their wheat
crop was not calculated to produce a normal harvest.3 24 The
farmers challenged this determination and also claimed that
because they had relied to their detriment on advice given
them by their ASCS county executive director (CED), the gov-
ernment should be estopped from denying the benefits.3 25
Reviewing only the administrative record and applying a def-
erential standard of review, the court limited its role to deter-
mining "whether a rational basis in the administrative record
underlies the decision reached. ' 32 6 The court found such ra-
tional basis and accordingly affirmed the ASCS determina-
tion.327 On the issue of equitable estoppel, the court held that
the farmers could not have reasonably relied on the CED's ad-
vice because the regulations expressly provide that his decision
is not the final authority. 28 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
Court affirmed the Claims Court's decision. 29
g. Ryder Farms, Inc. v. United States
At issue in Ryder Farms, Inc. v. United States330 was the
DASCO determination that the plaintiffs, a corporation and an
individual, were ineligible for deficiency payments. This deter-
mination was based on an ASCS finding that the plaintiffs sub-
mitted an erroneous crop acreage report. Pursuant to the
liquidated damages clause in the deficiency program contract,
ASCS assessed damages.33'
The plaintiffs sought review of the ineligibility determina-
tion and an award of damages.33 2 The government counter-
claimed to collect the liquidated damages and insurance
322. 24 Cl. Ct. 454 (1991).
323. Id. at 457-58.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 458.
326. Id. at 459.
327. Rivercrest v. United States, 24 CI. Ct. 454, 459-60 (1991).
328. Id. at 460.
329. Custom Ag Serv. v. United States, No. 92-5051 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1992).
330. 24 CI. Ct. 278 (1991).
331. Id. at 279-81.
332. Id.
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premiums allegedly owed for federal crop insurance for a pre-
vious crop.33 Mr. Ryder acknowledged that he owed the in-
surance premiums, but sought to offset the amount owed with
the government payments to which he was arguably entitled.
3 4
Mr. Ryder counterclaimed to recover for insurance losses. 3 5
The primary issue was whether Mr. Ryder filed an erroneous
crop acreage report.33 6 Accordingly, the case largely turned
on factual issues. The Claims Court determined that it was
"precluded from reviewing factual findings made by the
agency" under 7 U.S.C. section 1385. 337 On that basis, it as-
sumed the fact finding to be correct and affirmed the DASCO
determinations as rationally based on the facts as deter-
mined. 38 On Mr. Ryder's constitutional claims, the court
stated that it did not have jurisdiction over due process
claims.3 3 9
4. Unpublished Decisions
a. Doane v. Madigan
In Doane v. Madigan,340 the plaintiff, Russell Doane was de-
nied disaster assistance benefits. 34' After exhausting his ad-
ministrative appeal rights, Mr. Doane filed an action in federal
district court challenging the ASCS determination that he was
ineligible for benefits.342 Surprisingly, the government moved
for a remand of the case to DASCO 43 The court reluctantly
granted the request, stating that the Deputy Administrator
"failed to provide a basis for his decision," and that the limited
explanation for the determination was "incomplete and un-
clear. '3 4 4 The court found that the denial of benefits did not
set forth enough information to permit the court to even deter-
mine whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious. 4 5
333. Id. at 281.
334. Id.
335. Ryder Farms, Inc. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 278, 281 (1991).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 282.
338. Id. at 283.
339. Id.
340. No. 91-C-852-C (W.D. Wis. Mar. 12, 1992).
341. Id. slip. op. at 3.
342. Id. slip. op. at 7.
343. Id. slip. op. at 8.
344. Id. slip op. at 9.
345. Doane v. Madigan, No. 91-C-852-C, at 1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 12, 1992).
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b. Lucio v. Yeutter
Lucio v. Yeutter' 46 concerned plaintiff Joe Lucio's participa-
tion in the DTP. 47 Mr. Lucio purchased cattle as replace-
ments for cattle sold prior to the promulgation of the DTP
regulations.348 Subsequently, Mr. Lucio had a dispute with
ASCS as to the number of replacement cattle purchased. 49
Despite an investigation and report by the Office of the Inspec-
tor General (OIG) supporting Mr. Lucio's contention that 264
cattle had been purchased, DASCO held fast to its determina-
tion that only 200 cattle had been purchased. 5 0 On review,
the court found that ASCS had "failed miserably in following
its procedural appeal requirements" by failing "to employ the
'means most likely to obtain the facts relevant to the matter at
issue.' ",3 5 ' The court also noted that DASCO failed to prepare
a formal statement of the issues or a written record containing
a clear concise statement of material facts as required by 7
C.F.R. section 780.9. Moreover, the court concluded that the
ASCS determination was "against all evidence. 3 52 On this ba-
sis, the court had "no problem in finding" that the agency's
determination was "arbitrary and capricious and unsupported
by the evidence. ' 353 The court remanded the case to the
agency, requiring specific findings of fact and an adjustment of
the plaintiffs base consistent with the results of the OIG
report.3 54
D. Recurring Problems in ASCS Litigation
1. Choice of Forum
Final ASCS decisions may be challenged in either the federal
district court or in the United States Claims Court in Washing-
ton, D.C. Although the selection of one forum over the other
involves many considerations, the most significant considera-
tion may be the relief available from each court.
346. No. 90-2071, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13214 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 1992).
347. Id. slip. op. at 1.
348. Id. slip. op. at 1, n.i.
349. Id. slip. op. at 5-6.
350. Id. slip. op. at 6.
351. Lucio v. Yeutter, No. 90-2071, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13214, at 10 (D.D.C.
1992).
352. Id. slip. op. at 14.
353. Id.
354. Id. slip. op. at 16-17.
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On this consideration alone, the federal district court forum
offers more options for potential relief. In reviewing a final
ASCS decision, the district court has the authority to render a
declaratory judgment, 55 issue a writ of mandamus, 56 use its
general equitable powers to grant an injunction, 57 and award
damages up to the sum of $10,000.358 In contrast, the Claims
Court is essentially limited to awarding monetary damages
pursuant to the Tucker Act.3 59 Recent litigation has confirmed
the limitations of the Claims Court.360
Perhaps because of the jurisdictional limitations, and despite
strong authority to the contrary, ASCS frequently challenges
the jurisdiction of the district court. This challenge is based on
the argument that the plaintiffs are in fact seeking an award of
"money damages" even if their request for relief is an order
declaring that they are entitled to the payments under the farm
program at issue. The majority of courts have rejected this ar-
gument and found in favor of district court jurisdiction.3 6 ' Re-
cent decisions have reflected a following of this pattern. 6 2
2. Scope ofJudicial Review
In non-Tucker Act actions seeking judicial review of an ad-
verse administrative determination, the requisite waiver of sov-
ereign immunity by the government will be the APA.363 Under
the APA, with certain limited exceptions, judicial review is con-
355. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1988).
356. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).
357. See Esch v. Lyng, 665 F. Supp. 6, 15 (D.D.C. 1987), modified sub nom., Esch v.
Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
358. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988).
359. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1988).
360. See Ryder Farms, Inc., v. United States, 24 CI. Ct. 278, 282 (1991) (Claims
Court does not have jurisdiction over claims based on alleged violation of due pro-
cess rights); Hicks v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 647 (1991) (Claims Court's jurisdiction
does not extend to actions which sound in tort); Knaub v. United States, 22 CI. Ct.
268 (1991) (Claims Court does not have jurisdiction to consider promissory estoppel
claims).
361. See Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 978 (D.C.Cir. 1989) (relying on Bowen v.
Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988)); Justice v. Lyng, 716 F. Supp. 1567 (D. Ariz.
1989).
362. See Peterson Farms I v. Madigan, 782 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991); United
States v. Goode, 781 F. Supp. 704 (D. Kan. 1991); Vandervelde v. Yeutter, 774 F.
Supp. 645 (D.D.C. 1991) (each addressing ASCS's argument that the Claims Court
had exclusive jurisdiction and holding that the district court had jurisdiction to re-
view the ASCS program claim at issue).
363. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988).
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fined to a review of the administrative record for the purpose
of determining whether ASCS's action was: "(A) arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; [and] (D)
without observance of procedure required by law. . . ."'
Similarly, in Tucker Act litigation, although the APA is not
needed for its waiver of sovereign immunity, the Claims Court
has adopted the APA standard of review. For example, in Doty
v. United States,3 65 the plaintiffs sought review by the Claims
Court, requesting money damages for breach of contract. 6 6
At issue was the plaintiffs' participation in the DTP, a program
in which dairy farmers entered into contracts with the govern-
ment.367 Because the contract and the alleged breach of it was
the basis of the plaintiffs' cause of action, the plaintiffs argued
that the court should apply the standard of review applicable
to contract actions. 3 6  As the court conceded, ordinarily
breach of contract claims are reviewed de novo.3 69 However,
the court noted that the Claims Court "traditionally limited its
review in such cases to the administrative record" under the
APA's standards and after a lengthy analysis concurred with
that approach. °
Moreover, as has been referenced earlier, two statutes, 7
U.S.C. section 1385 and 7 U.S.C. section 1429, apply to the
judicial review of most final ASCS decisions and serve to re-
strict the scope of that review. In relevant part, section 1385
provides that "facts constituting the basis for ... any ... price
support operation, or the amount thereof, when officially de-
termined in conformity with the applicable regulations ...
shall be final and conclusive and shall not be reviewable by any
other officer or agency of the Government."13 7' Section 1429,
in relevant part, provides that "[d]etermination made by the
364. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D) (1988).
365. 24 CI. Ct. 615 (1991). See also supra text accompanying notes 289-321.
366. Id. at 616.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 624.
369. Id. at 624 (citing Northbridge Elecs. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1124, 1127
(1971)).
370. Doty v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 615, 624-27 (1991).
371. 7 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988).
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Secretary under [the Agricultural Act of 1949] shall be final
and conclusive....
These sections purport to grant finality to ASCS's findings
of facts by precluding a court from redetermining facts when
those facts have been officially determined in accordance with
the relevant regulations. The ASCS has argued that section
1385 grants complete finality to the agency's findings of fact
and precludes a court from reviewing those findings.373
Courts have responded to sections 1385 and 1429 in diver-
gent ways. On one extreme is the recent case of Simons v.
United States.3 74 In applying section 1385, the Simons court es-
poused the harsh interpretation that "factual findings of
DASCO are simply unreviewable under any standard, however
narrow, or for any reason, however compelling, when officially
determined in conformity with the applicable regulations. 3 75
The court also held that section 1429 limited review to the is-
sue of whether DASCO acted rationally, and that "the rational-
ity review permitted despite section 1429 is lawfully limited to
a comparison of an administrator's decision with the facts
found by him."' 376 In other words, the "test for rationality
must be conducted by comparing DASCO's legal conclusions
and ultimate determination with the facts found by him rather
than with the entire record.
3 77
In contrast, other courts have interpreted sections 1385 and
1429 far less restrictively and applied the APA's "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, abuse of discretion" standard.3 78 Under either inter-
pretation, however, the creation of a complete and accurate
administrative record is critical to the success of subsequent
judicial review.
IV. CONCLUSION
Federal farm programs are important for a significant
372. 7 U.S.C. § 1429 (1988).
373. See, e.g., Garvey v. Freeman, 397 F.2d 600, 604-05 (10th Cir. 1968).
374. 25 Cl. Ct. 685 (1992).
375. Id. at 697.
376. Id. at 698.
377. Id. at 699.
378. See Doty v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 615, 625 (1991) (citing Frank's Livestock
& Poultry Farm, Inc. v. United States, 905 F.2d 1515 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Schultz v.
United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 384 (1992). See also Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); Justice v. Lyng, 716 F. Supp. 1570 (D. Ariz. 1989); see generally Kelley &
Harbison, A Guide, (pt. II), supra note 20 at 472-75.
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number of America's agricultural producers. Accordingly, a
basic knowledge of the law governing federal farm programs
and the process for resolving federal farm program disputes is
essential for the attorney serving producers participating in
those programs. In its references to the principal, primary and
secondary authority regarding federal farm programs and to
recent federal farm program litigation, this Article should
serve as a beginning point for those attorneys who seek to be-
come more familiar with federal farm program law.
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